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Abstract in English 
Intergenerational risk sharing by funded pension schemes may increase welfare in an ex ante 
sense. However, it also suffers from a time inconsistency problem. In particular, young 
generations may be unwilling to start participating in a pension scheme if this requires them to 
make huge transfers to older generations. This paper explores if limiting the transfers between 
generations can make a funded pension scheme time-consistent. The paper finds that this is 
possible indeed in a more or less realistic economic environment; it is not the case in general 
however. The form of the time-consistent scheme (how strong are the limits to transfers) is 
found to be very responsive to the economic environment. The time-consistent scheme offers 
lower welfare than the original time-inconsistent scheme, but higher welfare than a 
defined-contribution scheme without any intergenerational risk sharing. 
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Abstract in Dutch 
Intergenerationele risicodeling door pensioenfondsen kan welvaartsverhogend werken doordat 
risico's beter over generaties worden gespreid. Het creëert tegelijkertijd echter ook een 
tijdsconsistentieprobleem. Met name kunnen jonge generaties besluiten niet aan 
pensioenregelingen deel te nemen als dit vereist dat ze hoge impliciete betalingen moeten doen 
aan oudere generaties. Dit paper onderzoekt of het mogelijk is pensioenregelingen 
tijdsconsistent te maken door overdrachten tussen generaties te beperken. Het paper concludeert 
dat dit inderdaad mogelijk is in een meer of minder realistische omgeving; het is echter geen 
algemeen resultaat. De vorm van de tijdsconsistente regeling (hoe sterk zijn de beperkingen op 
overdrachten tussen generaties) blijkt sterk afhankelijk te zijn van de economische omgeving. 
Met de tijdsconsistente pensioenregeling wordt een minder hoog welvaartsniveau bereikt dan 
met de overeenkomstige tijdsinconsistente regeling. Het welvaartsniveau van de tijdsconsistente 
regeling is echter hoger dan dat van een individuele defined contribution regeling zonder enige 
vorm van risicodeling. 
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sense. However, it also suffers from a time inconsistency problem. In particular, young
generations may be unwilling to start participating in a pension scheme if this requires them to
make huge transfers to older generations. This paper explores if limiting the transfers between
generations can make a funded pension scheme time-consistent. The paper ﬁnds that this is
possible indeed in a more or less realistic economic environment; it is not the case in general
however. The form of the time-consistent scheme (how strong are the limits to transfers) is
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21 Introduction
Deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension schemes share risks between generations. This raises aggregate
welfare if households are risk averse (Gordon and Varian (1988), Shiller (1999), Ball and
Mankiw (2007)) and if adverse general equilibrium effects on capital formation or labour supply
do not dominate (Krueger and Kubler (2006), Sánchez-Marcos and Sánchez-Martín (2006),
Bonenkamp and Westerhout (2010), Draper et al. (2011)).1 Risk sharing schemes suffer from a
time-consistency problem, however. Once a shock has materialized, some of the parties may ﬁnd
it unattractive to continue participation to the scheme. In particular, generations that are required
to make transfers will in general not be willing to do so, even if they judged participation to the
scheme as attractive before the uncertainty was resolved. If participation is voluntary, these
generations will then decide to quit. If participation is obligatory, this route is blocked, but, in
this case, these generations can vote with their feet. Indeed, they can reduce their labour market
participation.2 They can also emigrate to another ﬁrm, industry or country, depending on the
coverage of the pension scheme in which they participate. They can also vote with their voice,
for example by pleading for the introduction of an opting-out clause through the political
process. As a consequence, it can be argued that, even if participation is mandatory, DB pension
schemes are ultimately unsustainable.3
As such, the argument is incomplete, however. In particular, the opportunity costs of no
longer being able to share the beneﬁts from intergenerational risk sharing when they are old,
may keep young generations from abandoning the contract. Hence, the welfare gain from risk
sharing may act as a threshold for the transfers that can be imposed onto the younger
generations: only if these transfers exceed the money value of the threshold, will the young
generations have an incentive to abandon the pension contract.4
The existence of a threshold has an important additional implication. In particular, it may be
exploited to construct a scheme that avoids the discontinuity risk. The idea is to impose a limit to
1 Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) and Fehr and Habermann (2008) also focus on the tradeoff between the direct effects of
risk sharing and the associated effects on economic behaviour. Different from our paper however, these papers focus on
intragenerational rather than intergenerational risks.
2 This can be done in several ways. Workers can reduce their number of working hours or retire at some earlier date.
Those who have not already entered the labour force can decide not to participate on the labour market or to postpone
labour market entry. Moreover, workers and those outside the labour market can decide to become self-employed if the
obligation to participate in the pension scheme does not apply to the self-employed. This is the case in the Netherlands, a
country with which I am familiar.
3 This result applies in case of a stable population structure. In the case of population ageing, which characterizes large
parts of the western world, the risk that young generations opt out of the schemes may be larger.
4 In general, there are several other reasons why young cohorts may favor a social security scheme. Examples are
altruistic motives, dynamic efﬁciency and within-cohort redistribution. We will allow a role for these factors by introducing a
catch-all variable d below. For a discussion of these motives, see Galasso and Profeta (2002).
3the transfers from the young generations to the old generations that is equal to the money value
of the threshold. This will then achieve that young generations will never ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to
abandon the pension contract. In general, they will beneﬁt from the contract; in the worst case,
they will be indifferent between opting in and opting out. If we succeed to construct such a
scheme, it may be expected to deliver lower welfare than the original scheme, but, unlike the
original scheme, be time-consistent. If the scheme implies some risk sharing among generations,
no matter how little, it will achieve higher welfare than the benchmark of an individual
deﬁned-contribution scheme, in which there is no intergenerational risk sharing at all.
However, a time-consistent scheme need not exist. The maximum transfer that young
generations are required to make to the scheme determines not only the cost of participation, but
also the beneﬁt of participation upon changing the value of intergenerational risk sharing. In a
rational expectations equilibrium, young generations are aware of the fact that limits to
intergenerational transfers apply also when they have become old and will account for this in
their decision-making. More speciﬁcally, if decreasing the maximum transfer that the young
make to the old, reduces the future beneﬁt from risk sharing more than the current cost, no
time-consistent scheme will be found for which future beneﬁt and current cost are equal for
some level of maximum transfer.5 Below, we will indeed encounter an example for which a
non-trivial time-consistent scheme cannot be found.
We argue that the time-consistent scheme needs to obey a participation constraint for the
young, but not for the old. The reason why is that opting out by the old differs on a crucial point
with opting out by the young. Opting out by the old would mean that they abandon a (implicit)
contract which they signed at some earlier date. Opting out by the young however means that
they do not sign a contract that they consider unattractive in the ﬁrst place. Supervisory policies
sufﬁce to achieve that signed contracts are respected, which means in this context that only the
young will be allowed to opt out of the pension scheme.6
Can the old prevent a breakdown of the scheme through the political process (Gordon and
Varian (1988))? This question relates to a large political-economy literature in which decisions
on the contents of the pension scheme (and its continuation) are made in a voting process
(Cooley and Soares (1999), Razin et al. (2002), Casamatta et al. (2005) and Cremer et al.
5 This may explain why Van Hemert (2005) fails to ﬁnd a second-best scheme with positive transfers. In his analysis,
transfers are one-sided, from the young to the old. An increase of the threshold rate of return below which no additional
risk sharing will take place, may then reduce the gains from risk sharing in the retirement period more strongly than in our
case, in which an increase of the threshold rate of return reduces both the transfers to and the transfers from the then
young generation in the retirement period. The same may be true for Beetsma et al. (2011), which also studies one-sided
contracts.
6 This restriction is also a necessary condition for an insurance contract. For if the old would have the possibility to opt
out, no viable insurance contract would be possible: in all circumstances would one of the cohorts have an incentive not to
respect the contract once the shock has materialized.
4(2007)). Then, the weights attached to the interests of the young and the old determine what will
be the ﬁnal result. This paper argues that opting out can be achieved through other means as
well, think of reducing labour market participation, shifting to some other industry or moving
abroad. Therefore, we think that the incentives for young cohorts to leave the scheme should be
given a larger weight than those for old cohorts. We take this to the extreme by disregarding
completely the interests of the old in the process that describes the continuation of the scheme.
In the ﬁeld of pensions, there is some earlier literature on the issue of discontinuity risk.
Teulings and De Vries (2006) and Bovenberg et al. (2007) report the discontinuity risk that
corresponds with several degrees of intergenerational risk sharing. Gollier (2008) makes a step
further: this paper explores a second-best scheme that reduces the discontinuity risk by a
combination of investment policies, beneﬁt policies and shareholder dividend policies. Beetsma
et al. (2011) explore pension contracts that limit the transfers from young to old generations in
order to reduce the discontinuity risk. None of these papers eliminates the discontinuity risk
completely however as the present paper does. In other parts of the economic literature,
contracts that fully eliminate discontinuity risk have been studied before. Indeed, Thomas and
Worrall (1988) studies wage contracts between workers and ﬁrms, Atkeson (1991) studies
contracts between lenders and borrowers and Kocherlakota (1996) studies risk sharing contracts
between different consumers.7
Our results are relevant for the current policy debate. Many countries consider to reform their
pension schemes away from collective schemes with more deﬁned beneﬁt features towards
individual schemes with more deﬁned contribution features. Such a reform implies that the
beneﬁts from risk sharing will be lost. This paper points out that pension schemes can be
reformed such that part of the intergenerational risk sharing and the associated beneﬁts can be
maintained. The proposed reform implies a reduction of risk sharing rather than a complete
elimination of it.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the issue in general
terms. It constructs a model in which households have 2-period lifes and in which a pension
scheme shares risks between the two generations that overlap. Section 3 offers a numerical
analysis to illustrate our ﬁndings. Section 4 presents a sensitivity analysis that shows the role of
key parameters. Section 5 concludes.
7 Each study has its own terminology. Thomas and Worrall (1988) talks about self-enforcing contracts, Atkeson (1991)
talks about contracts that are individually rational and Kocherlakota (1996) talks about subgame-perfect allocations.
52 A model of risk sharing
Our model features overlapping generations of households and a pension fund. We describe
them in turn. Before doing so however, we discuss the general properties of the model.
2.1 Outline of the model
We specify a model that contains only what is necessary to discuss our ideas. We thus adopt a
small open economy framework with exogenous labor supply.8 This leaves aside general
equilibrium effects on labor and capital markets that are not crucial for a discussion of the
time-consistency argument. There is only one risk factor, which is the return on a risky asset, the
only ﬁnancial asset that is available. We thus leave aside portfolio (re-)allocation effects and
other risk factors, like labor productivity risk or demographic risk. Furthermore, we allow for
only two generations in each period of time and include only two generations in our risk sharing
scheme.
This modeling of the risk sharing scheme determines the nature of the model, which we
consider to be static. Indeed, it implies that the model is without history. Immediately upon
introducing a pension scheme, a new steady state is achieved. Our modeling of the risk sharing
scheme also implies that it is suboptimal. Indeed, a scheme that would be chosen by a social
planner would include all current and future generations into the risk sharing scheme (Ball and
Mankiw (2007)). We have refrained from adopting such a ﬁrst-best approach. Apart from
changing the nature of the model from a static to a dynamic one, we doubt whether this approach
would yield realistic results. Risk sharing would take an inﬁnite number of years and current
policies would still reﬂect shocks from many decades ago. Our model absorbs shocks within the
unit period of the model, which we take to be about 30 years (each generation lives for two
periods). Actually, we think 30 years may be unrealistically high, but surely not unrealistically
low.
2.2 Households
Preferences are deﬁned over consumption when young and when old, c1 and c2. The rate of
return on the only ﬁnancial asset available, r, is stochastic and is drawn from an identical and
independent distribution. The gross rate of return, 1+r, is strictly positive, thus the net rate of
8 Bohn (2010) discusses the role of competitive labour markets in case of company pension funds. The pension scheme
in our model should be interpreted as an institute that operates on a national scale, so that workers cannot escape
increments in pension contributions by moving to a different ﬁrm.
6return is strictly larger than -1.
Hence, we assume the following:
Ut = u[c1;t; ˜ Et(c2;t+1)]+d (2.1)
c1;t = y  st  P[(rt  Et 1(rt))st 1] (2.2)
c2;t+1 = st(1+rt+1)+P[(rt+1 Et(rt+1))st] (2.3)
Equation (2.1) deﬁnes intertemporal utility for the generation born in period t, which is assumed
to be well-behaved. Period-t and earlier shocks have materialized before birth; period-t +1
shocks are unknown at that time. Therefore, equation (2.1) makes use of the expectations
operator, dated in period t. The expectations operator in (2.1) refers to a certainty-equivalent
expectation (Epstein and Zin (1989)), which we will elaborate below. We use a tilde to
distinguish this expectations operator from the standard expectations operator. Equations (2.2)
and (2.3) make up the budget constraint. Here, y denotes exogenous labour income and s
denotes savings.
Equations (2.2) and (2.3) include a risk sharing function P, which describes the transfer from
the young to the old generation through the pension scheme. The risk sharing function has as
argument (rt  Et 1(rt))st 1, which is the unexpected part of the return on saving times the
amount of saving, or, more compactly, the unexpected capital income of the old. Given that we
assume the rate of return on savings to be i.i.d., we will use E(r) as a shorthand notation for
Et 1(rt) in the following. The risk sharing function differs for the three cases that this paper will
explore: the deﬁned-contribution case, the time-inconsistent hybrid case and the time-consistent
hybrid case. We will discuss the function in detail below.
The variable d in equation (2.1) denotes the value of participation in a pension scheme that
shares risks between generations. Indeed, d takes a zero or positive value in the two public
schemes, whereas it has zero value in the individual DC scheme. The variable d reﬂects a
preference for solidarity. It assumes that people are happy to participate in a public pension
scheme that features solidarity between generations by transferring risks borne initially by some
generation to other generations. This may be interpreted as altruism or inequity aversion, aspects
that are strongly supported by empirical evidence (Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
Should we interpret the individual DC scheme as individual savings held in the form of bank
accounts, d could be given a wider interpretation. For example, it could reﬂect the assumption
that pension funds are better investors than individual households in the sense that the former
reap higher average returns or less variable returns on their savings. Henceforth, we will adhere
to the interpretation of the individual DC scheme as a pension scheme that invests solely for the
purposes of a speciﬁc generation and that does not engage in intergenerational transfers however.
72.3 Pension transfer schemes
We distinguish between three different types of pension schemes: a pure deﬁned-contribution
(DC) scheme and two types of hybrid schemes, a time-inconsistent one and a time-consistent
one. The latter two schemes are hybrid in the sense that they are in between pure deﬁned-beneﬁt
(DB) and pure DC schemes. To make the three schemes comparable, we assume that they levy
the same average premiums upon working households. They differ only in the corresponding
risk sharing schemes that apply to pension contributions and beneﬁts.
The level of pension premiums can be pinned down at several levels. A natural option is to
set premiums at the level that maximizes household welfare in the DC scheme. Formally, st is
then determined by the ﬁrst-order condition ¶ ˜ Et 1(Ut;dc)=¶st = 0, where we use subscript dc to
refer to the DC case. Note that a period-t shock in the rate of return does not affect welfare of the
household born in period t: not directly, as households enter economic life without ﬁnancial
wealth, nor indirectly, as the DC scheme does not feature any intergenerational transfers with the
generation born in period t  1. Hence, the above ﬁrst-order condition is equivalent to
¶Ut;dc=¶st = 0.
The DC scheme is deﬁned as the scheme without any intergenerational transfers:
Pdc[(rt  E(r))st 1] = 0 (2.4)
In the case of a time-inconsistent hybrid scheme, we specify redistributive transfers as
proportional to the deviation of the contemporaneous rate of return from its expected value,
Pti[(rt  E(r))st 1] = p(rt  E(r))st 1 (2.5)
where subscript ti is used to refer to the time-inconsistent hybrid scheme.
Combining this equation with that for period-2 consumption, equation (2.3), gives an
expression for the rate of return on pension saving in the time-inconsistent hybrid scheme:
1+rt+1+p(rt+1 E(r)). The value of the risk sharing parameter p determines the nature of the
pension scheme. If p equals -1, we have that the rate of return on pension saving is
non-stochastic. We then have a pure DB scheme, in which the pension beneﬁt is completely
unrelated to the capital market rate of return. If p equals 0, the scheme coincides with the DC
scheme. If  1 < p < 0, the pension scheme is a hybrid case, in between the cases of a pure DB
and a pure DC scheme.
In the time-consistent case, the redistributive function is more complex:
Ptc[(rt  E(r))st 1] = p(max[ˆ rt;min[rt; ¯ rt]] E(r))st 1 (2.6)
where subscript tc is used to refer to the time-consistent hybrid scheme.
8The latter formula includes a max-min function of the contemporaneous rate of return on
savings and threshold returns ˆ rt and ¯ rt, to be deﬁned later, rather than the contemporaneous rate
of return itself. This limits the redistributive transfers between the young and the old: transfers
from the young to the old cannot exceed p(E(r)  ˆ rt)st 1; transfers to the young cannot exceed
p(¯ rt  E(r))st 1.
The static nature of our model implies that not only E(r) is time-invariant. Also, the level of
saving and the two threshold rates of return are constant through time. Hence, we will denote
these as s, ˆ r and ¯ r respectively, thus omitting the time index, in the following.
Figure 2.1 illustrates. It depicts the transfers from the young to the old through the pension
scheme in the case of a time-inconsistent and time-consistent pension scheme. The
time-inconsistent pension scheme implies intergenerational transfers that are proportional with
rt  E(r). The time-consistent pension scheme restricts the size of intergenerational transfers
both on the downside and the upside. Figure 2.2 displays the consequences for second-period
consumption. The curve that refers to the time-inconsistent case is ﬂatter than that corresponding
to the DC case, reﬂecting the risk sharing in the former case. This assumes  1 < p < 0. If
p =  1, the consumption curve for the time-inconsistent scheme would be ﬂat and if p = 0, it
would have the same slope as the conusmption curve for the individual DC scheme. In the
time-consistent case, the curve is also ﬂatter, but only on the domain ˆ r < rt < ¯ r. Outside this
domain, the curves of the time-consistent scheme and of the DC scheme move parallel to one
another. This reﬂects that for rt < ˆ r and rt > ¯ r, the time-consistent pension scheme provides no
risk sharing at the margin.
The max-min function in equation (2.6) truncates the distribution of the rate of return twice:
at rt = ˆ r and at rt = ¯ r. In our discussion of the time-consistent pension scheme below, we will
explain that the participation decision of the young cohort determines the value of ˆ r. The value
of ¯ r relates to the value of ˆ r: ¯ r will be chosen such that expected transfers between the young
and the old are zero.
Note that any scheme with  1  p < 0 achieves risk sharing between the young and old
generation. We let the pension fund choose p such that it maximizes the expected lifetime utility
of the generation that is born at the time at which the pension scheme is introduced. This
approach differs somewhat from the approach of maximizing a social welfare function, as
pursued by for example Gollier (2008) and Bohn (2009). The advantage of our approach is that
it allows us to establish whether the introduction of a pension scheme is Pareto improving. This
criterion is stronger than that of a potential Pareto improvement, which results from adopting a
social welfare approach.
Our approach is not necessarily the most realistic one, as it neglects the political
decision-making process (on this, see D’Amato and Galasso (2010)). However, it does provide a
9Figure 2.1 Risk-sharing transfers in the time-inconsistent and time-consistent pension scheme
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benchmark that can be used to illustrate the effects of discontinuity risk. Moreover, it is
sufﬁciently general to capture a large number of real-world pension schemes in between pure
deﬁned-beneﬁt and deﬁned-contribution.
Intertemporal utility as deﬁned in equation (2.1) is an ex post measure. For welfare analysis,
we also deﬁne its ex ante counterpart, which is the (certainty-equivalent) expectation of
intertemporal utility over all possible realizations of rt:
Vt = ˜ Et 1(Ut) (2.7)
It is now time to characterize the time-inconsistent and time-consistent scheme. We start with
the former.
2.4 The optimal time-inconsistent hybrid scheme
We deﬁne the optimal time-inconsistent scheme as the scheme with that value of p, denoted p,
that maximizes welfareV as deﬁned in equation (2.7). p follows from elaborating the
corresponding ﬁrst-order condition,
¶Vt;ti=¶p = 0 (2.8)
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Substitution of p into the expression forVt;ti yieldsV
t;ti, i.e. welfare under the optimal
time-inconsistent hybrid scheme.
2.5 The optimal time-consistent hybrid scheme
The optimal time-inconsistent scheme takes over the slope of its risk sharing scheme from the
optimal time-consistent scheme. This may be suboptimal. Numerical problems hinder an
extension to different slopes, however. Moreover, such an extension is not really necessary for
our purpose of showing that a pension scheme can be made time-consistent.
Speciﬁc to the time-consistent scheme is that it truncates the transfer function. It does so at
two sides, at rates of return ˆ r and ¯ r. The truncation at the downside of the rate-of-return
distribution is due to the participation constraint which we will elaborate below. Restricting risk
sharing at the upside goes along with risk sharing at the downside such as to ensure that average
transfers in the time-consistent scheme are zero. Allowing non-zero average transfers would
imply ex ante redistribution between the two generations.9 This would bring in a PAYG element
in the time-consistent scheme and would make it impossible to attribute differences between the
9 The difference between ex ante redistribution and risk sharing is that risk sharing between generations is conditional on
the occurrence of a shock. Ex ante redistribution occurs irrespective the occurrence of a shock.
11time-inconsistent scheme and the time-consistent scheme solely to their risk characteristics.
Formally,
E(max[ˆ r;min[r; ¯ r]]) = E(r) (2.9)
This equation implicity solves for ¯ r as a function of ˆ r.
The participation constraint speciﬁes ˆ r, the rate of return at which the rate-of-return
distribution will be truncated at the downside. We ﬁnd the value of ˆ r by specifying that the
participant will be indifferent between participating in the pension scheme and staying out of the
scheme if rt = ˆ r, recognizing that the same truncation will apply to the rate-of-return distribution
in period t +1. For rt lower than ˆ r, transfers are at their maximum andUt;tc =Ut;dc. For rt
higher than ˆ r, transfers to the old cohort are lower (and possibly negative) andUt;tc >Ut;dc. This
scheme is time-consistent as the participation constraint is obeyed in all states of nature (all
values of rt): putting ˆ r at a lower value would violate the constraint for at least some values of rt.
The scheme is optimal as it minimizes the probability that the constraint is binding: putting rt at
a higher value would restrict intergenerational risk sharing too much and therefore yield lower
ex ante utility. In the general case in which -1<ˆ r<E(r), both the case in which the participation
constraint is binding and the case in which it is not have strictly positive probability.
Formally, the participation constraint gives the value of ˆ r that ensures that participation in the
time-consistent scheme delivers as much utility as staying out of the pension scheme if the
period-t rate of return on saving equals ˆ r,
Ut;tc(rt; ˆ r; ¯ r(ˆ r)) =Ut;dc rt = ˆ r (2.10)
where I have made explicit thatUt;tc is a function of rt, the realization of the period-t rate of
return on savings, and ˆ r and ¯ r, the threshold rates of return.
Having solved for ˆ r, we can substitute it into the expression forVt;tc, which gives usV
t;tc.
We assume thatUt;ti  Ut;dc<0 for rt=-1, the worst possible state. If this were not true,
participation in the time-inconsistent pension scheme would be beneﬁcial for all values of rt and
the time-inconsistent scheme would be viable. Second, we assume thatUt;ti  Ut;dc>0 for
rt=E(r). This is a quite weak assumption, which reﬂects the gains from intergenerational risk
sharing.
Despite these assumptions, a solution to the participation equation may not exist. As the
participant is rational, he recognizes that changing the maximum of transfers to the old
generation affects not only the current cost of participation, but also the future beneﬁt of
participation upon changing the value of intergenerational risk sharing. If, starting at a rate of
return for which participation in the pension scheme gives lower utility than the fall back of
staying out, decreasing the maximum transfer that the young make to the old reduces the future
beneﬁt more than the current cost, no time-consistent scheme will be found.
12In the simulations presented in this paper that do ﬁnd a solution for the optimal
time-consistent scheme, the rate-of-return distribution is separated in three different regions, one
in which the participation constraint is binding and transfers by the young are at their maximum,
one in which transfers by the young are at their (negative) minimum and one in which transfers
are in between their minimum and maximum (see also Figure 2.1).
2.6 Welfare assessment
Our policy experiment is extremely simple. Initially, we have an individual DC scheme. At time
t then, nothing changes (the DC scheme continues) or a time-inconsistent hybrid scheme is
introduced or a time-consistent hybrid scheme is introduced. Furthermore, from now on we will
use the term time-(in-)consistent hybrid scheme to denote the optimal time-(in-)consistent
hybrid scheme; suboptimal hybrid schemes will not be studied. In case a time-(in-)consistent
hybrid scheme is introduced, the policy change was not announced before, which rules out any
anticipation effects. The model is such that it reaches a steady state immediately upon changing
the pension scheme. Periods t +i i = 1;2;:: are thus equivalent with period t. Generations
affected by the policy change are the generation that is old at the time of the policy change, the
generation who is young at the time of the policy change and the generations born in later time
periods. We call the former generation the transitional generation and all other generations
steady-state generations.
We rank the DC scheme, the optimal time-inconsistent hybrid scheme and the optimal
time-consistent hybrid scheme by their (ex ante) welfare measures, i.e. Vt j;dc,V
t j;ti and
V
t j;tc. Here, j = 0;1, with j = 0 referring to steady-state generations and j = 1 referring to the
transitional generation. To enable a meaningful interpretation, we also calculate the
corresponding consumption-equivalent welfare changes. The consumption-equivalent welfare
change measures by how much percent a generation’s consumption (in both periods and in all
states of the world) in the DC case would need to change to obtain the same level of welfare as
in the (time-inconsistent or time-consistent) case with a pension scheme. We will denote the
consumption-equivalent welfare change asCVt j;ti andCVt j;tc j = 0;1 for the
time-inconsistent and time-consistent case respectively.
A complicating factor arises in case of a non-zero preference for public schemes (d = 0).
The calculated welfare effects then mix two things: the gains from risk sharing and the utility
value of the preference for public schemes. In order to extract the welfare gain that is due to
intergenerational risk sharing only, we also calculate consumption-equivalent welfare changes
relative to a hypothetical DC scheme in which households attach the same utility to participation
as they do in the two public schemes. We use tildes to denote the corresponding
13consumption-equivalent welfare changes: ˜ CVt j;ti and ˜ CVt j;tc j = 0;1. Obviously, in case
d = 0, the latter coincide with the original welfare measuresCVt j;ti and CVt j;tc.
Importantly, the welfare effect of the transitional generation dominates that of the
steady-state generations. Indeed, the steady-state generations share risks both when young and
when old with the other generation that is alive at that time. The transitional generation, i.e. the
generation who is old at the time the pension scheme is introduced, will engage in
intergenerational risk sharing only when old. Hence, the transitional generation will always be
more positively affected by the introduction of the pension scheme than the steady-state
generations. Indeed, like the steady-state generations, the transitional generation beneﬁts from
more stable old-age consumption, but, unlike the steady-state generations, does not suffer from
less stable working-age consumption. To evaluate whether the introduction of a pension scheme
will constitute a Pareto improvement, we can therefore abstract from the welfare effect upon the
transitional generation. Indeed, if the introduction of the pension scheme increases the welfare
of the generation born at t, all generations enjoy a welfare gain and the policy change constitutes
a Pareto improvement.
3 A numerical assessment of the gains from risk sharing
This section presents a benchmark simulation that illustrates the ideas developed in the previous
section and that provides insight into the order of magnitude of likely effects. Subsection 3.1
lists the assumptions we make on preferences, the economic environment and parameter values.
Section 3.2 discusses the results for the benchmark case.
3.1 Assumptions for the benchmark case
There is one risk factor: the rate of return on savings. Preferences, deﬁned over consumption, are
of the recursive utility type: they feature an elasticity of intertemporal substitution and a
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion that are both constant but not necessarily each other’s




















































14where 1=q denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, s denotes the coefﬁcient of
relative risk aversion and d denotes the rate of time preference.
We adopt Epstein-Zin preferences since they allow us to disentangle the aversion of the
consumer for risk and for intertemporal ﬂuctuations; these two aspects of consumer preferences
are described by two different parameters, s and q respectively. The case where preferences are
additively separable is a special case of these more general preferences; it results when we
impose s = q (in this special case, the general expectations operator ˜ E coincides with the
standard expectations operator E).
Our benchmark calculation puts the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to 0.5 and the
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion to 10. This is in line with the literature that ﬁnds the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution to be close to zero and the coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion to be much larger than one. Estimates of both parameters exhibit a large variety in the
literature however, so we will perform a sensitivity analysis to ﬁnd out how important are the
values of these parameters for our results.
The rate of time preference is taken to be 4.74. This implies an annual rate of 6%. Sensitivity
simulations reported on below show that the relevance of the numerical value of this parameter is
quite small. Altruism is absent in our benchmark simulation: d = 0. Finally, labour income, y, a
scaling variable, takes a value of 100.
We assume that the return on savings is lognormally distributed. This assumption is quite
common, although a distribution with thicker tails would provide a better match with the data.10
The lognormal distribution is quite handy when it comes to transforming an annual distribution
into the 30-year distribution that we use in our analysis. It is also handy to relate the two
threshold rates of return to one another.11
In particular, the log of the gross rate of return on savings follows a normal distribution with
mean 1.202 and variance 0.225. This corresponds to the assumption that the annual rate of return
on savings has a mean of 4.48% and a standard deviation of 9.06%, that the unit period of our
model covers 30 years and that the return on savings follows a lognormal distribution that does
not change over time. The ﬁgure for the standard deviation is taken from Campbell and Viceira
(2002), after correction for the fact that we assume savings to consist of riskless bonds and risky
equity in equal amounts. The ﬁgure for the mean is also based on Campbell and Viceira (2002),
but corrects for the fact that in general the historical excess return can deviate strongly from the
10 One reason for this may be rare disasters (Barro (2006)).
11 Equation (2.9) speciﬁes the condition that average transfers are zero in the time-consistent scheme:
E(max[ˆ r;min[r; ¯ r]]) = E(r). If the rate of return on savings is lognormally distributed, this condition can be elaborated as
F((log(1+ ¯ r) mr)=sr) F((log(1+ ˆ r) mr)=sr) = F(((log(1+ ¯ r) mr)=sr) sr) F(((log(1+ ˆ r) mr)=sr) sr),
where F(:) denotes the standard normal distribution function and mr and sr refer to the mean and standard deviation of
log(1+r) respectively.
15equity premium. Fama and French (2002) present two calculations of the difference between the
two concepts. The average of their estimates of the difference between the historical excess
return and the equity premium is 4%-point. In order to give equal support to the two strands, we
reduce Campbell and Viceira’s (2002) estimate with half the difference as calculated by Fama
and French. Hence, we reduce Campbell and Viceira’s (2002) average rate of return on equity,
8.85%, with 2%-points, giving an estimate equal to 6.85%. Recalling that the riskless rate of
return equals 2.11% and that savings are made up of riskless bonds and risky equity in equal
amounts, we calculate the average annual portfolio rate of return to be
1/2*(2.11%+6.85%)=4.48%.
Our stochastic simulation takes 200 draws for each of the two stochastic variables, giving
40,000 runs in total. In order to reduce sample bias, we make two corrections to the draws. First,
we add a factor to all sample elements such that the sample mean becomes equal to the
theoretical mean, which coincides with the sample mean in an asymptotically large sample.
Second, we multiply all sample elements in deviation from their theoretical mean with a factor
that brings equality between the sample variance and the theoretical variance, which, similar to
the theoretical mean, applies in the asymptotic case. As sample elements we take the log return
realizations to avoid that these corrections would render one or more rate of return data negative
(see Poterba (2004) for a similar procedure).
3.2 Results for the benchmark case
Table 3.1 summarizes our results for the benchmark case. The ﬁrst column shows results for the
DC scheme. Pension savings equal 27.8 (27.8 percent of a wage income of 100), so that
ﬁrst-period consumption has a value of 72.2. Second-period consumption in the
deﬁned-contribution scheme is stochastic. On average, it equals 103.0, but there is huge
variation around this average value. Indeed, Table 3.1 shows that the 5th and 95th percentiles
deviate strongly from the average value (40.2 and 188.5 respectively).
The second column of Table 3.1 displays the time-inconsistent (TI) hybrid scheme. This
scheme features risk sharing between the young and old generation. Indeed, the
time-inconsistent hybrid pension scheme shifts risk away from the period of retirement towards
the period of labor market participation. This is seen in the ﬁgures for the 5th percentile and 95th
percentile of ﬁrst-period consumption; equal in the DC scheme and strongly different in the TI
scheme. It is also seen in the corresponding ﬁgures for second-period consumption; the 5th and
95th percentiles of second-period consumption deviate substantially less from the mean of the
distribution in the TI case.
The TI hybrid scheme features a transfer function that has slope jpj equal to 16.6%. Hence,
16Table 3.1 The three pension schemes in the benchmark case
DC scheme TI hybrid scheme TC hybrid scheme
E(c1) a 72.2 72.2 72.1
5th percentile c1 72.2 61.8 65.7
95th percentile c1 72.2 86.4 82.9
E(c2) 103.0 103.0 103.1
5th percentile c2 40.2 50.6 46.7
95th percentile c2 188.5 174.3 177.8
s 27.8 27.8 27.8
-p(%) - 16.6 16.6
ˆ r - - 1.3
¯ r - - 5.0
˜ CVt(%) - 9.1 5.6
˜ CVt 1(%) - 12.9 7.7
a We omit the time subscript unless this could be confusing.
the TI scheme shifts about a sixth of the capital income risk for the old in the DC scheme
towards the younger cohort. Even in the TI scheme, the elderly thus bear more risk than the
youngsters. That the two do not share equally the capital income risk in the economy is due to
the fact that in our model, risk aversion with regard to second-period consumption is lower than
that with regard to ﬁrst-period consumption on account of time preference.
The consumption equivalent of the welfare gain from a move from the DC scheme to the
time-inconsistent hybrid scheme equals 9.1%. The welfare gain for the transitional generation is
higher, as explained above: it is calculated as 12.9%.
As will be clear by now, the problem with the time-inconsistent scheme is that utility from an
ex post perspective may be lower than utility in the fall-back option, which here is the DC
scheme. We can calculate a threshold rate of return at which the time-inconsistent scheme and
the DC scheme are equivalent from an ex post perspective. We now writeUt;ti explicitly as a
function of rt, note thatUt;dc is independent of rt and denote the threshold rate of return as ˚ r. We
can then derive a value for ˚ r from the following condition:
Ut;dc =Ut;ti(˚ r) (3.4)
For the benchmark case, we can calculate that ˚ r=0.6. To this corresponds a probability of 5.6%.
Can we now ﬁnd a time-consistent scheme that eliminates this discontinuity risk?
The third column of Table 3.1 answers this question in the afﬁrmative. It indicates that the
optimal time-consistent scheme features threshold rates of return, ˆ r and ¯ r, that equal 1.3 and 5.0
respectively. Note that ˆ r is higher than ˚ r. This is intuitive. At rt = ˚ r,Ut;tc will be less thanUt;ti
(andUt;dc, asUt;ti andUt;dc are equal by deﬁnition) as the time-consistent scheme yields less risk
sharing than the time-inconsistent scheme in the second period of life. ˆ r is deﬁned as the value
17of rt for whichUt;tc equals Ut;dc. Thus, Ut;tc must be raised and this is achieved by restricting
further the maximum transfer imposed on the young generation. Hence, ˆ r must be higher than ˚ r.
Hence, the transfer scheme of the time-consistent pension scheme is ﬂat for rates of return in
between -1.0 and 1.3 and for rates of return higher than 5.0. To ease interpretation, this
corresponds with annual rates of return of 2.8% ((1+1:3)1=30 1) and 6.2% ((1+5:0)1=30 1)
respectively.
One may recall that we have chosen to construct our time-consistent pension scheme such
that it does not entail ex ante redistribution between the generations. Hence, average
consumption in the two periods should be equal for the two types of hybrid pension schemes.
Table 3.1 shows that this is not completely true in the case of the TC hybrid scheme, although
the differences are small. The reason for this is small sample size. The differences are such small
that we consider our sample as sufﬁciently large.
The TC case compromises the DC case and the TI case in terms of the spread of ﬁrst- and
second-period consumption. The 5th and 95th percentiles of ﬁrst-period consumption are in
between their counterparts of the DC case and the TI case; the same holds true with respect to
the corresponding percentiles of second-period consumption. The frequency distributions of
c2;t+1 have a similar shape in the three schemes, with the DC scheme featuring the highest
degree of dispersion and the TI scheme the lowest. As regards c1;t, the frequency distributions
are different however. In the DC case, the frequency distribution boils down to one spike; absent
intergenerational transfers, c1;t is non-stochastic. The time-inconsistent case features a sort of
continuous distribution. As a result, c1;t in the time-consistent case features a distribution that
combines two spikes with a sort of continuous distribution in between. This reﬂects that c1;t will
deviate from its mean because of intergenerational transfers and that these transfers feature a
lower and upper bound. The two spikes reﬂect the bounds and the distribution in between the
spikes reﬂects the unbounded transfers.
The time-consistent scheme adds less to welfare than the time-inconsistent scheme. Indeed,
the consumption equivalent of the welfare gain (corrected for the participation preference d) is
now 5.6%, compared with 9.1% in the time-inconsistent case. Similarly, the consumption
equivalent of the welfare gain for the transitional generation is now 7.7% and 12.9% in the
time-inconsistent case.
How do the calculated welfare gains in the time-inconsistent case relate to those of earlier
research? A number of papers have reported effects for steady-state generations. Cui et al.
(2011) presents calculations of the welfare gain due to intergenerational risk sharing in the range
2-4%. Bonenkamp and Westerhout (2010) assess the welfare gain from risk sharing to be an
order of magnitude higher: 7.1%. Similarly, Bovenberg et al. (2007) calculates a welfare gain of
8.3%. Gollier (2008) presents a much larger effect: 19%. The differences in the results of the
18different papers seem to be due to different modelling assumptions (two-period versus
multi-period lives, risk sharing between two versus an inﬁnite number of generations,
consumption versus terminal wealth as argument of the utility function, two ﬁnancial assets
versus one ﬁnancial asset), different parameter values (as regards the coefﬁcient of risk aversion,
the mean and standard deviation of the equity rate of return) and the approach to calculate
welfare effects (an overlapping-generations approach versus a representative-agent approach).
The range of results is thus fairly wide; our results are somewhere in the middle of this range.
The consumption equivalents of the utility gains in the time-consistent case are little smaller
than their counterparts in the time-inconsistent case: 5.6% compared with 9.1% for the
steady-state generations and 7.7% compared with 12.9% for the transitional generation. The
elimination of discontinuity risk thus reduces the scope for intergenerational risk sharing, but
does not eliminate it. The effects in Gollier (2008) are more outspoken: there, the move from a
ﬁrst-best scheme to a second-best scheme about halves the welfare gain from intergenerational
risk sharing.
4 Alternative simulations
This section presents two sets of alternative simulations. The ﬁrst set varies the value of d. The
second set of alternative simulations explores the role of values of parameters that describe
preferences and parameters that describe the economic environment.
4.1 The role of altruism
In order to ﬁnd out the role of altruism, we run simulations with different values for d. The other
parameters take the same values as in the benchmark case.
Table 4.1 Analysis of the effect of altruism
Number d -p(%) ˜ CVt;ti(%) ˜ CVt 1;ti(%) ˆ r ¯ r ˜ CVt;tc(%) ˜ CVt 1;tc(%)
BM 0.0 16.6 9.1 12.9 1.3 5.0 5.6 7.7
1 1.0 16.6 9.1 12.9 0.6 7.9 7.2 10.5
2 3.0 16.6 9.1 12.9 -0.4 20.6 9.1 12.9
The pattern that emerges from the simulations is clear. Increasing the value for d makes the
public pension scheme more attractive and thus decreases the discontinuity risk. As a
consequence, the time-consistent pension scheme can decrease the value for ˆ r and increase that
of ¯ r, thus enlarging the scope for risk sharing. This increases the welfare gains that the
19time-consistent scheme achieves as compared with the individual DC scheme, both for
steady-state and transitional generations.
A value for d of 3.0 is already sufﬁcient to let the problem of discontinuity risk disappear.
Indeed, ˆ r is chosen extremely low and ¯ r extremely high. The welfare gains to steady-state and
transitional generations are approximately the same as the welfare gains in the time-inconsistent
case.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
In order to ﬁnd out how the results of the previous section relate to our assumptions on the values
of key parameters, we conduct a sensitivity analysis. In particular, we simulate economies with
higher and lower values for the parameters that describe preferences (the coefﬁcient of relative
risk aversion, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the rate of time preference) and for
the parameters that describe the economic environment (the mean and the volatility of the rate of
return on saving). Table 4.1 reports on the input of the simulations, Table 4.2 on the output.
A few observations can be made. First, the range of welfare gains is large, both for the
time-inconsistent case and the time-consistent case. In case of the time-consistent pension
scheme, the welfare effects for steady-state generations range from zero to 12.2%. Second, the
welfare gain achieved by a time-consistent scheme is a sizeable fraction of the gain that the
corresponding time-inconsistent scheme brings about: for steady-state generations, this fraction
amounts to 62% in the benchmark case with much lower and higher values in some of the other
simulations.
Thirdly, variations in the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion exercise substantial effects. The
simulations that adopt values for the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion of 6.7 and 15 achieve
corrected consumption-equivalent welfare gains for steady-state generations that equal 3.4% and
5.6% respectively. The relation between risk aversion and the welfare gain from a
time-consistent pension scheme is clearly positive on two accounts. First, a higher degree of risk
aversion directly increases the utility gain from a better risk allocation. Second, an indirect effect
reinforces this direct effect: a higher risk aversion softens the participation constraint, which
induces the pension fund to organize more risk sharing in the time-consistent scheme. Krueger
and Kubler (2006) also derive that the welfare gain from pension schemes relates positively to
the degree of risk aversion. Yet, the result is not general however. In particular, in a model with
an endogenous portfolio choice, higher risk aversion may induce households to choose more
conservative portfolios, thereby reducing the welfare gains from risk sharing (Gollier (2008),
Bonenkamp and Westerhout (2010) and Cui et al. (2011)).
Fourthly, variations in the mean and the volatility of the rate of return on savings have even
20larger effects than those of variations in the degree of risk aversion. A higher mean rate of return
on savings reduces the welfare gain from a pension scheme. A higher mean rate of return raises
consumption in the case of a DC scheme; a given gain in consumption in absolute terms then
counts less in relative terms. A higher standard deviation of the rate of return on savings has the
opposite effect. It reduces consumption in the case of a DC scheme. A given gain in
consumption in absolute terms then counts more in relative terms. Interestingly, the case of a
lower volatility is extreme in the sense that no non-trivial time-consistent pension scheme can be
found. Intuitively, the gains from risk sharing are too small to compensate young generations for
potentially large payments in the ﬁrst period of their lives. The only scheme that obeys the
participation constraint is then one that coincides with a DC scheme and which offers no risk
sharing at all (ˆ r and ¯ r have converged to a single value). Simulations (not shown) in which we
took a much more conservative value for the coefﬁcient of risk aversion, namely 4, yielded the
same result. Hence, the result that a time-consistent scheme may not exist is robust and will arise
when the gains from risk sharing are large, on account of low volatility or low risk aversion.
Fifthly, the effects of variations in the rate of time preference and the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution are small. Although the effects are clearly non-zero, they are an order
of magnitude smaller than the effects that are due to changing risk aversion or the mean or
standard deviation of the rate of return on savings.
Table 4.2 Sensitivity analysis: input
Number s q d E(r) sr
BM 4.0 2.0 4.7 4.5 9.1
1 4.0 2.0 3.2 4.5 9.1
2 4.0 2.0 7.1 4.5 9.1
3 4.0 1.3 4.7 4.5 9.1
4 4.0 3.0 4.7 4.5 9.1
5 2.7 2.0 4.7 4.5 9.1
6 6.0 2.0 4.7 4.5 9.1
7 4.0 2.0 4.7 3.5 9.1
8 4.0 2.0 4.7 5.5 9.1
9 4.0 2.0 4.7 4.5 7.1
10 4.0 2.0 4.7 4.5 11.1
5 Concluding remarks
This paper started from the observation that participation in a pension scheme that shares risks
between generations may be unattractive, even if the scheme increases efﬁciency in an ex ante
sense. Indeed, welfare of some future generation may decrease in states of nature that are bad as
21Table 4.3 Sensitivity analysis: output
Number -p(%) ˜ CVt;ti(%) ˜ CVt 1;ti(%) ˆ r ¯ r ˜ CVt;tc(%) ˜ CVt 1;tc(%) At(%)a
BM 16.6 9.1 12.9 1.3 5.0 5.6 7.7 62
1 15.5 9.8 14.1 1.3 5.1 6.0 8.4 61
2 17.8 8.4 11.6 1.3 4.9 5.1 6.9 61
3 25.1 9.8 13.8 1.2 5.4 6.5 9.1 66
4 11.3 7.7 10.7 1.4 4.7 4.4 5.8 57
5 18.5 7.0 9.5 1.9 3.8 3.4 4.1 49
6 14.3 8.9 13.5 1.0 5.8 5.6 8.7 63
7 20.2 12.2 16.5 0.1 6.0 10.2 14.1 84
8 13.4 6.7 9.8 3.4 4.6 1.6 1.9 24
9 20.2 5.7 8.1 2.7 2.7 0.0 0.0 0
10 13.5 13.5 18.8 -0.1 14.0 12.2 17.2 90
a At denotes ˜ CVt;tc= ˜ CVt;ti.
seen from an ex post perspective. The central result of this paper is that generally such welfare
losses can be eliminated by limiting the transfers between generations. As some risk sharing
between generations is maintained, the introduction of a time-consistent scheme that avoids ex
post welfare losses entails a Pareto improvement.
As a consequence, the government does not need to oblige people to participate in the
pension scheme. It is important to provide two caveats in this respect, however. First, our paper
has assumed like most of the literature that people are forward looking and do not suffer from
short-sightedness. If people are myopic however, they may fail to recognize the beneﬁts from
future risk sharing and hence decide not to participate in the scheme. Second, we have embraced
the standard assumption that preferences are constant across generations. Theoretically, one
cannot exclude that somewhere in the future cohorts will have different preferences, for example
a different degree of risk aversion, however. If they have lower risk aversion, future generations
may attach so much lower value to intergenerational risk sharing that it will be optimal for them
to terminate the implicit pension contract. This has immediate consequences however. The
expectation of a collapse of the system somewhere in the future will imply the collapse of the
system today if people are sufﬁciently forward-looking.
Our paper has chosen to model only what is necessary to make our point. Hence, the analysis
can be extended in several directions. One extension is to include multi-period life cycles in
order to increase the realism of the model. If cohorts are allowed to opt out at any stage in their
life, the set of participation constraints will expand considerably. Whether then still a
time-consistent scheme can be found, is an open question. Secondly, the model can be modiﬁed
such as to describe the case of a PAYG scheme. Indeed, both PAYG pension schemes and funded
pension schemes can and do provide intergenerational risk sharing and the issue of time
22consistency holds in the case of a PAYG-ﬁnanced pension scheme as well. Finally, the model
can be generalized to account for demographic changes over time. This would allow to study the
consequences of population ageing, which is a major issue in large parts of the world.
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